Cognitive Catharsis in *The Caucasian Chalk Circle*[1]

R. DARREN GOBERT

In Bertolt Brecht’s 1930 *Lehrstück* [learning play] *The Measures Taken*, the Four Agitators relate to the Control Chorus (and their offstage audience) the events leading up to their killing of the Young Comrade, whose violation of the teachings of Communism has endangered their cause and justified his sacrifice. During their propaganda efforts, they explain,

> [W]e went down into the lower section of the city. Coolies were dragging a barge with a rope. But the ground on the bank was slippery. So when one of them slipped, and the overseer hit him, we said to the Young Comrade: “Go after them, make propaganda among them after work. But don’t give way to pity!” And we asked: “Do you agree to it?” And he agreed to it and hurried away and at once gave way to pity. (*Measures* 84)[2]

The Young Comrade’s first misstep – significantly, an acquiescence to pity – figures as a moment of peripeteia, demarcating, in Aristotle’s terms, the end of the play’s involvement. The Agitators’ denunciation of pity (which constitutes one pillar of their juridical defense) is upheld in the play’s unraveling, in which the Control Chorus adjudges the killing justified: “We agree to what you have done” (*Measures* 108). Thus, *The Measures Taken*, which has been called the “classic tragedy of Communism,” seems to make susceptibility to pity the Young Comrade’s hamartia, reversing his fortunes and leading to his expulsion from the collective (Sokel 133).[3]

Brecht here employs his customary sly irony, echoing the tragic form while signaling the *Lehrstück*’s militancy against Aristotle by castigating pity, one of the constituent elements of katharsis as well as its enabling precondition. More generally, the Agitators’ disdain for the Young Comrade’s pity (a disdain they describe but do not display for the Control Chorus) enacts Brecht’s contempt for theatrical emotion in his early career. “I don’t let my feelings intrude in my dramatic work,” he declared in a 1926 statement that John Willett calls “the first expression of his doctrine of the ‘epic theatre’” (“Conversation” 14; qtd. in Brecht, “Conversation” 16): “Contrary to present custom [figures] ought to be presented quite coldly, classically and objectively. For they are not a matter for empathy; they are there to be understood. Feelings are private and limited. Against that the reason is fairly comprehensive and to be relied on” (“Conversation” 15).[4] This binary distinction between “feelings” and “reason” is often taken as Brecht’s position on theatrical emotion in general, an assumption with justification in Brecht’s writings of the period. Indeed, his notorious 1930 table itemizing axes of distinction between “dramatic” and “epic” theatres climaxes in “feeling [*Gefühl*]” versus “reason [*Ratio*]” (“Modern Theatre” 37; “Anmerkungen zur Oper” 79). This stance toward “feeling” is borne out in his early plays, with their reluctance either to represent emotion or to incite it. As Brecht instructs his spectators in his prologue to his 1927 play *In the Jungle of the Cities*: “Judge impartially the technique of the contenders, and keep your eyes fixed on the finish” (118).

Brecht’s hostility toward emotional effects in this period is rooted in his refusal to view spectators as objects to be conditioned in the manner proposed by some of his Soviet counterparts. But Brecht’s equation of spectatorial emotion with group passivity recedes in his theoretical writings, as his resistance to theatrical emotion softens. This softening, complete by the 1953 version of the "Short Organum for the Theatre,"[5] does not represent a "theoretical compromise" on the issue of emotion – the judgment is John Willett's – but rather a gradual rejection of the behaviorist paradigm relied upon by Eisenstein, Meyerhold, and like-minded theorists (qtd. in Brecht, "On Experimental Theatre" 135).[6] Brecht's 1944 declaration that "the orthodox theatre […] sins by dividing reason [*Vernunft*] and emotion [*Gefühl*]" suggests a prescient view of emotions that challenges the orthodoxies of 1940s psychology and philosophy whose cultural dominance would not slip for many years ("Little Private" 162; "Kleine Liste" 315–16). In this article, I locate the plays and theoretical writings that led up to *The Caucasian Chalk Circle* within a history of "emotion," a concept that has undergone significant upheaval in the last century. More specifically, I trace how Brecht's evolving view of emotion foretells the displacement in this history of one paradigm of the emotions by another: their wholesale rejection in *The Measures Taken* and its onstage Control Chorus emblematizes Brecht's response to behaviorist emotion, while his nuanced treatment of emotion in *The Caucasian Chalk Circle* highlights the integral role that emotions, differently understood, might play in ethical decision making. But while Brecht's later texts prefigure cognitivist dramatic theory such as that of Martha Nussbaum, they also offer a nuanced corrective *avant la lettre* to its excesses. His description of and indulgence in emotive clarification help to elucidate and evaluate the ways in which a cognitive katharsis might function. To speak of Brechtian catharsis may seem counterintuitive. Yet, as Dickson notes, Brecht "devotes more space [to catharsis] in his critical writings than to any other single aspect of traditional theatre" and "came to regard it as the cardinal principle of dramatic tradition" (233). As we will see, all of Brecht's writings on emotion are relevant to the question of catharsis in general and to the interpretation of katharsis in the *Poetics* in particular.[7] That is, in an irony that he would no doubt appreciate, Brecht insightfully glosses his theoretical adversary, Aristotle.

Brecht had complained in 1931 that American comedies, like Soviet didactic art, treated the human being as an "object" and the audience as if it were "made up of Pavlovians [*Reflexologen*]," an inert mass to be acted upon by emotional stimuli ("Film" 50; *Der Dreigroschenprozeß* 478).[8] That Brecht's rejection of emotion equates to a rejection of behaviorist emotion is made equally clear in a 1935 article. Discussing "aristotelian theatre," he writes,

> It is a common truism among the producers and writers of [this] type of play that the audience, once it is in the theatre, is not a number of individuals but a collective individual, a mob, which must be and can be reached only through its emotions; that it has the mental immaturity and the high emotional suggestibility of a mob.[…] The latter theatre [*Lehrstücke*] holds that the audience is a collection of individuals, capable of thinking and of reasoning, of making judgments even in the theatre; it treats it as individuals of mental and emotional maturity, and believes it wishes to be so regarded.[9] ("German Drama" 79)

Brecht's description of the mob in the "Aristotelian" tradition echoes Eisen-stein's description of the proletarian audience whose consciousness he proposed to forge as one forges iron, by "concentrating the audience's emotions in any direction dictated by the production's purpose" ("Montage" 41).[10] And in so writing, Brecht distinguished himself from various Soviet artists whose work had been influential on him and whose interest in various kinds of antirealistic defamiliarization he continued to share.[11] Eisenstein's view and others like it rely on a collectivist view of spectatorship that erases distinctions between individuals in the audience; for the early Brecht, such a view follows logically from a model of theatrical and film emotion as reflexive and conditioned. Brecht had written in 1936 that "[a]cceptance or rejection of [characters'] actions and utterances was meant to take place on a conscious plane, instead of, as hitherto, in the audience's subconscious" ("Alienation" 91); his seemingly interchangeable usage of "psychological" and "subconscious" in this period betrays his assumption that emotions reside outside reason or consciousness – an assumption that reflects the cultural currency of psychoanalysis and behaviorism in the 1930s.

Therefore, Brecht's program required him to refigure the audience as a "collection of individuals" instead of a "collective individual," finding in a model of individual spectatorship a basis for individual agency. To do so, Brecht had both to disentangle individual spectators from a collective audience and to distance them from emotional effects such as identification and catharsis. As he wrote in 1935,

> non-aristotelian […] dramaturgy does not make use of the “identification” of the spectator with the play, as does the aristotelian, and has a different point of view also towards other psychological effects a play may have on an audience, as, for example, towards the “catharsis.” Catharsis is not the main object of this dramaturgy.[…] [I]t has as a purpose the “teaching” of the spectator a certain quite practical attitude.[…][12] (“German Drama” 78)

Brecht asserts that the empathetic identification of spectators with a hero concentrates their collective emotion in a single direction, ensnaring them in a somatic, uncritical experience; his theatre, on the other hand, “teaches” its individual spectators by avoiding the emotional. “Conscious” understanding thus requires an assiduous avoidance of emotional effects; in a theatre based on alienation effects, “the audience [is] hindered from simply identifying itself with the characters in the play” – that is, prevented from being constructed as a collective (“Alienation” 91). Similarly, for the early Brecht, hindering such an identification requires an acting style different from that proposed by Stanislavsky or, for that matter, Eisenstein:[13]

> it is simpler [for the actor] to exhibit the outer signs which accompany these emotions and identify them. In this case […] there is not the same automatic transfer of emotions to the spectator, the same emotional infection. The alienation effect intervenes, not in the form of absence of emotion, but in the form of emotions which need not correspond to those of the character portrayed. On seeing worry the spectator may feel a sensation of joy; on seeing anger, one of disgust. (“Alienation” 94)[14]

But Brecht’s experiments in this period with “A-effects,” which sought precisely to preclude emotional identification, led to a reappraisal of the role of emotion in theatrical representation and reception. By 1940, he had conceded the resilience of emotional effects: “As for the emotions, the experimental use of the A-effect in the epic theatre’s German productions indicated that this way of acting too can stimulate them, though possibly a different class of emotion is involved from those of the orthodox theatre” (“Short Description” 140). Indeed, Brecht even allows in his appendices to this essay that “emotions [*Emotionen*]” can work alongside “reason [*Ratio*],” an observation, he claims, that “will surprise no one who has not got a completely conventional idea of the emotions” (“Short Description” 145; “Über rationellen” 501). In other words, Brecht imagines a space within which “emotions” can aid the pedagogical function of theatre, which imagining requires him to separate the “emotional” from the still-stigmatized realm of the “subconscious” or the “psychological.” In order to understand how “emotion” could be reintroduced to “reason,” Brecht’s 1940 readers would, indeed, have needed a less than “completely conventional” idea of the emotions; signaling his own increasingly unconventional understanding, he writes, “All the modern theatre is doing is to discard an outworn, decrepit, subjective sphere of the emotions and pave the way for the new, manifold, socially productive emotions of a new age” (“Little Private” 161). As he articulates in 1940, in this modern theatre, “emotions are only clarified [*geklärt*] […], steering clear of subconscious origins and carrying nobody away” (“On the Use” 88; “Über die Verwendung” 162).

In a remarkable coincidence, in the same year, the Liddell–Scott–Jones *Greek–English Lexicon* entry for “katharsis [καθαðρσιος]” was updated, its editors adding the denotation “clarification” to the word’s other meanings, including “purging” and “purification.” The new definition heralded an entirely new interpretation of Aristotle’s notoriously vague clause (*Poetics* 1449b), an interpretation first articulated in Leon Golden’s 1962 article “Catharsis” and elaborated in his 1969 and 1976 articles.[15] These texts set the foundation for more detailed versions of kathartic clarification in Stephen Halliwell’s *Aristotle’s Poetics* and Martha Nussbaum’s *The Fragility of Goodness* (both 1986).[16] Certain features of these accounts emerge as central. First, pleasure derives from (seemingly unpleasurable) pitiable and fearful experience because this experience is accompanied by intellectual insight.[17] Second, the insight drawn from the particular, historical scene represented is general or even universal – that is, the emotion is intellectual insofar as it facilitates an inductive judgment from a particular case.[18] Third, this clarifying katharsis in the audience is rooted in the playwright's mimesis, uniting the apparent telos of tragedy with tragedy's general function in society. The audi-ence's understanding derives not from intellectual argumentation, as in some neoclassical tragedies, but rather from an emotionally engaged spectatorship that leads spectators to a judgment about the causes of the protagonist's suffering. Emotions are clarified in the manner that Brecht had proposed for his "non-Aristotelian" theatre, enabling rather than obfuscating understanding.

Golden's emphasis on the audience's "judgment" is foregrounded in Nuss-baum's account of katharsis, which stresses spectators' emotional pleasure in seeing representations because, as Aristotle argues in Book 4 of the *Poetics*, we draw conclusions about the images that we see (7; Nussbaum, *Fragility* 388). Significantly, though, in *Fragility*, Nussbaum bristles at Golden's translation of *Poetics* 1449b: "[*k*]*atharsis* does not *mean* 'intellectual clarification.' It means 'clarification,'" she writes (390; emphasis in original). Clarification derives from emotions, Nussbaum argues, because emotions themselves are cognitive. As she writes elsewhere, "Once we notice their cognitive dimension, as Golden did not, we can see how they can, in and of themselves, be genuinely illuminating" ("Tragedy" 281). Having adumbrated a cognitivist view of emotions that she would fully articulate in 2001's *Upheavals of Thought*, Nussbaum's argument in *Fragility* can reach a sublimely Aristotelian telos: "we might try to summarize our results by saying on Aristotle's behalf that the function of a tragedy is to accomplish, through pity and fear, a clarification (or illumination) concerning experiences of the pitiable and fearful kind. But that is, by a surprising piece of good luck, exactly what Aristotle has already said" (391).

Precepts of the cognitivist paradigm on which Nussbaum relies might be summarized as follows:[19]

1 physiological changes are signs that an emotion is occurring; they do not constitute the emotion as (most strikingly) in the behaviorist model;[20] 2 emotions are intentional – that is, directed by an agent toward an object; 3 emotions are rational or predicated upon beliefs; 4 emotions are evaluative, necessarily involving judgments or appraisals; and

5 emotions give rise to, rather than being constituted by, behaviors. Each of these features, we will see, has a role to play in tragic practice as Nussbaum has theorized it and – surprisingly – as Brecht has metatheatrically glossed it.

Cognitivism arose out of the same disenchantment with behaviorism that Brecht had articulated in the 1930s, specifically behaviorism's inability to explain the extraordinary complexity of individual behaviors[21] – and Brecht's journey provides an excellent analogue for cognitivism's ascent and its integration of "emotion" into "reason." Not incidentally, the shift in Brecht's position correlates with a change in his view of Aristotle; as M.S. Silk notes, looking to the later Brecht, we find explicit "evidence of a compromise with the *Poetics*, as part of a series of shifts in Brecht's overall theoretical position" (189). While Silk claims that "the relative tolerance and restraint of [Brecht's] later compromise seems unimpressive in comparison to the verve and the intellectual edge of the earlier formulations" (189), in fact, Brecht's "compromise" articulates a more sophisticated position than did his earlier declarations of "anti-Aristotelianism," one that derives from the more nuanced understanding of emotion that his "compromise" reveals. Emotion, or at least a behaviorist understanding of emotion, drove Brecht away from Aristotle – but emotion, on Brecht's new understanding, would also help reconcile him to the *Poetics*.

Tellingly, Brecht's "Short Organum" begins by acknowledging the correctness of Aristotle's dictum that poetry is first and foremost pleasurable ("Kleines Organon" 66–67).[22] It connects this pleasure explicitly to katharsis: "Thus what the ancients, following Aristotle, demanded of tragedy is nothing higher or lower than that it should entertain people.[…] And the catharsis of which Aristotle writes – cleansing by pity and fear, or from pity and fear – is a purification [*Waschung*] which is performed not only in a pleasurable way, but precisely for the purpose of pleasure" ("Short Organum" 181; "Kleines Organon" 67). Without embracing catharsis, Brecht concedes that the emotional response of the spectator is fundamental to the spectacle – a concession sharpened in a posthumously published appendix in which he acknowledges that he had been "too inflexibly opposed" to the "dramatic," his long-time synonym for "Aristotelian" ("Appendices" 276). Unlike the *Lehrstücke*, then, the modern theatre permits the spectator's emotional involvement and even encourages the role of emotions in ethical action. Through its emotional pleasures, the theatre can facilitate the audience's "unceasing transformation [*Verwandlung*],” Gotthold Lessing’s term for catharsis that Brecht uses in a strikingly different way (“Short Organum” 205; “Kleines Organon” 97).

A year after finishing the “Short Organum” – his lengthiest treatment of, and his most sustained and internally coherent theoretical statement on, theatrical emotion – Brecht similarly defended his new position to Friedrich Wolf:

> It is not true, though it is sometimes suggested, that epic theatre (which is not simply undramatic theatre, as is also sometimes suggested) proclaims the slogan: “Reason this side, Emotion (feeling) that.” It by no means renounces emotion, least of all the sense of justice [*Gerechtigkeitsgefühl*], the urge to freedom, and righteous anger; it is so far from renouncing these that it does not even assume their presence, but tries to arouse or to reinforce them. The “attitude of criticism” which it tries to awaken in its audience cannot be passionate enough for it. (“Formal Problems” 227; “Formprobleme” 110)

More than merely connecting “justice” to “emotion” in this passage, Brecht equates the two, describing “justice” and “anger” as parallel emotion-terms and expressing the former with a compound: *Gerechtigkeitsgefühl*. Brecht thus anticipates the cognitivist notion that emotions are based on beliefs and are experienced as part of appraisals: the theatre, he claims, “reinforces” such evaluative emotions in the spectators, presumably by setting before them objects for appraisal and emotional agents whose judgments can be shown to be sound or unsound. Reaching back to the Greeks, then, Brecht adapted *Antigone* that same year, noting that it was chosen for the “topicality of [its] subject matter” – a subject matter that not coincidentally emphasizes the soundness of Antigone’s inductively and emotionally motivated actions over Creon’s deductive and dogmatic ones (“Masterful Treatment” 210). As Brecht writes in his verse précis of the plot, the play shows us “how, as Antigone was brought in and questioned as to why / she broke the law, she looked around and turned to the Elders / and saw that they were appalled and said: ‘To set an example’” (*Sophocles’ Antigone* 2).[23] Aristotle had linked poetry’s aims of bringing pleasure and conferring insight, noting that men “enjoy the sight of images because they learn as they look” (*Poetics* 1448b). Brecht, in choosing *Antigone* and defending its “topicality,” thus concurs with Aristotle about the pleasure – and insight-bearing qualities – of tragedy.

However, Brecht, who had declared in 1935 the necessity for the director to have a historian’s eye, disagrees with Aristotle’s understanding of universal, transhistorical truth – for Aristotle insists that the insights of poetry are universal and not (like those of history) particular (“Anmerkungen zur ‘Mutter’” 172). Adopting a Marx-inflected model of history instead, Brecht writes in the “Short Organum” that “[w]e need a type of theatre which not only releases the feelings, insights and impulses possible within the particular historical field of human relations in which the action takes place, but employs and encourages those thoughts and feelings which help transform the field itself” (190). The ethical soundness of Antigone’s emotional actions, then, would be historically bound, and their relevance to the 1948 audience could not be taken for granted – hence Brecht’s addition of a prologue to the play, set in modern times. In it, two sisters in post-war Berlin discover first, to their joy, that their beloved brother has deserted the Nazi army and second, to their sorrow, that he has been hanged for so doing. The prologue ends abruptly with a Nazi officer questioning one sister, who is preparing to cut down her brother’s corpse from the hook on which it hangs. Brecht exposes laws operative in Sophocles’ tragedy (as Aristotle envisioned[24]) – the ethical dilemma a totalitarian state causes a loving sister – but locates these laws within two different historical frames. He writes that “there can be no question of using the Antigone story as a means or pretext for ‘conjuring up the spirit of antiquity’”: “Even if we felt obliged to do something for a work like *Antigone* we could only do so by letting the play do something for us” (“Masterful Treatment” 210–11). These simultaneous gestures of embracing Sophocles’ text and rendering it strange are encapsulated in Brecht’s title, *Sophocles’ Antigone [Antigone des Sophokles]*.

The prologue invites us analogically to draw a conclusion about the as-yet-unmade judgment of the sisters in the prologue from the wisdom gained from Antigone and Ismene in Sophocles’ plot. This process is similar to the one that (according to Golden’s account) Aristotle proposes, where the spectator apprehends a general insight from the particular scene represented – with the crucial difference that, in Brecht’s case, we are compelled to draw a historically located, not universal, conclusion. As he wrote in

"Short Organum," "If art reflects life it does so with special mirrors. Art does not become unrealistic by changing the proportions but by changing them in such a way that if the audience took its representations as a practical guide to insights and impulses it would go astray in real life" (204). As if to ensure that the play is not misconstrued as offering a transhistorical "moral," Brecht leaves this structure open: although the prologue ends on a note of suspense, with the sisters questioned about their brother by a Nazi officer, the play never returns to its initial setting.

A similar framing device contextualizes the insights into emotional judgment provided by *The Caucasian Chalk Circle*, Brecht's strongest reconciliation between the demands of his political theatre and the shadow cast over it by Aristotle. The judgment in the central action (the validity of Grusha's claims on the infant) is analogically paralleled with the judgment in the prologue (the validity of the fruit-growing kolkhoz's claim on the valley). Grusha's story, set "[o]nce upon a time," thus fulfills the role of the "general" or "poetry" in Aristotle's schema, while the story of the dueling kolkhozes intends explicitly to reintroduce the particular or "history," as suggested by Brecht's revisions: he had originally situated the play in 1934, emphasizing the agricultural restructuring that was happening in the Soviet Union, but later updated the action to highlight the theme of post-war reconstruction (*Caucasian* 9;[25] Ritchie 18).

These two levels of action are mediated by the Singer, who thus fulfils the role of the Greek chorus. Just as he had lauded the Greeks' use of masks in "Short Organum," Brecht notes in his foreword to *Antigone* that the use of the chorus in classical tragedy was an A-effect (*Antigonemodell* 75). However, the Singer's presence in the prologue also stifles the impulse to generate a universal moral, not alienating the spectators so much as framing the presentation of reality before them so that it can be seen more clearly. The Singer chorically mediates between the represented action and his onstage (instead of offstage) audience; in this way, the onstage kolkhozes presumably refract or deflect the offstage audience's impulse to identification with the spectacle. For Azdak's judgment may not be relevant to the specific historical field offstage; rather, it announces its relevance only to the context of post–World War II Soviet Georgia. As Brecht wrote to his publisher in 1954,

> *Die Fragestellung des parabelhaften Stücks muß ja aus Notwendigkeiten der Wirklichkeit hergeleitet werden und ich denke, es geschah in heiterer und leichter Weise. Ohne das Vorspiel ist weder ersichtlich, warum das Stück nicht der chinesische Kreidekreis geblieben ist (mit der alten Richterentscheidung), noch, warum es der kaukasische heißt. Zuerst schrieb ich die kleine Geschichte (in den „Kalendergeschichten" gedruckt). Aber bei der Dramatisierung fehlte mir eben ein historischer und erklärender Hintergrund.* (*Briefe* 3: 256–57)
>
> [The question posed by the parable-like play must be seen to derive from the necessities of reality, and I think that this has been done in a cheerful and light way. Without the prologue it is neither evident why the play has not remained the Chinese chalk circle (with the old verdict) nor why it is called Caucasian. First I wrote the little story (that was printed in *Kalendergeschichten*). But for the dramatization I felt I needed a historical, explanatory background.]

Publicly, however, Brecht had been squeamish about the appellation "parable." Presumably fearing that a text so described might be taken to offer universal insight, he had written in 1944 that

> *Der „Kaukasische Kreidekreis" ist keine Parabel. Das Vorspiel könnte darüber einen Irrtum erzeugen, da äußerlich tatsächlich die ganze Fabel zur Klärung des Streitfalls wegen des Besitzes des Tals erzählt wird. Genauer besehen aber enthüllt sich die Fabel als eine wirkliche Erzählung, die in sich selbst nichts beweist, lediglich eine bestimmte Art von Weisheit zeigt, eine Haltung, die für den aktuellen Streitfall beispielhaft sein kann.* ("Zu 'Der kaukasische'" 342)
>
> [The *Caucasian Chalk Circle* is no parable. The prologue could possibly produce such a mistaken impression, since superficially the whole fable will be told to clarify the argument over the valley's ownership. More precisely observed, the fable is seen as a real story that in itself proves nothing, but merely shows a certain kind of wisdom, an attitude, that can be an example for the present argument.]

The framed story of the chalk circle test, he claims, demonstrates for the kolkhozes not a just verdict but "a certain kind of wisdom" – "an attitude" that might help produce a verdict in the still-undecided argument over the valley's ownership.

The Measures Taken had also used a chorus to direct the action – "Step forward!" they declare at the top – as well as to "enlighte[n] the spectator about facts unknown to him" (*Measures* 77; "Theatre for Pleasure" 72). In that play, the chorus recapitulates and endorses the clear-headed "rational" judgment of the Agitators, which proceeds deductively from the precept that communist utility trumps individual desire – that "[a] single man can be wiped out" in the interests of the Party (*Measures* 101). In *The Caucasian Chalk Circle*, by contrast, the Singer's mediation supports the position that ethical actions ought to proceed inductively from emotional assessments instead of from categorical precepts like those that govern in *The Measures Taken*. As the Expert in the prologue says, "It's true that we have to consider a piece of land as a tool with which one produces something useful. But it's also true that we must recognize the love for a particular piece of land" (*Caucasian* 5). Sound law in *The Caucasian Chalk Circle* not only replaces capitalist precedents with Marxist ones; it also formally integrates the social and individual emotional concerns that undergird decisions – like Grusha's decision to save Michael or later to fight for his custody – into the process that regulates ethical correctness and guarantees social harmony.

To do so Brecht demonstrates, *pace* behaviorist psychology and in advance of cognitivist theory like that of Nussbaum's *Upheavals*, that emotions are a valid source of illumination. His commitment to this demonstration reveals itself in a choice to represent emotions more fully onstage. Brecht notes in the "Short Organum" that *The Caucasian Chalk Circle* relies on presentational

methods, as when the Singer uses an "unemotional way of singing to describe the servant-girl's rescue of the child" (203). But elsewhere, the play contains more conventional representations of emotion that seem designed, as clearly as Kattrin's death scene in *Mother Courage*, to incite a sympathetic emotional response. These scenes uphold Brecht's comment in his notes for "Der Messingkauf" that "[n]either the public nor the actor must be stopped from taking part emotionally; the representation of emotions must not be hampered, nor must the actor's use of emotions be frustrated" (173). For example, Grusha's heartbreaking, post-war reunion with Simon is mimetically, even realistically, rendered: she confronts him – "*with tears in her eyes*" and "*in despair, her face streaming with tears*" – with the news that she has married during their separation (*Caucasian* 58; 59). Her inability to explain the circumstances of her strategic union with Yussup augments the scene's pity-inducing effect. Moreover, Grusha's emotional development during her absence from Simon is marked by this scene's difference from the couple's engagement scene before she left with Michael; the earlier scene's avoidance of emotion – as well as its "objective" emphasis on social utility – seems parodic of the early Brecht:

> SIMON May I ask if the young lady still has parents?
>
> GRUSHA No, only a brother.
>
> SIMON As time is short – the second question would be: Is the young lady as healthy as a fish in water?
>
> GRUSHA Perhaps once in a while a pain in the right shoulder; but otherwise strong enough for any work. So far no one has complained.
>
> SIMON […] The third question is this: Is the young lady impatient? Does she want cherries [i.e., *Äpfel*] in winter?
>
> GRUSHA Impatient, no. But if a man goes to war without any reason, and no message comes, that's bad.
>
> SIMON A message will come.[…] And finally the main question …

GRUSHA Simon Chachava, because I've got to go to the third courtyard and I'm in a hurry, the answer is "Yes." (*Caucasian* 18; *Der kaukasische* 109)

Of course, the play's most emotional scene is its climactic custody trial, and the difference between it and Brecht's earlier representations of legal proceedings, like the differences between the Singer and earlier choric figures, is deeply resonant. Brecht had used trial scenes previously – in *The Measures Taken* but also in *The Exception and the Rule* and *The Good Person of Szechuan*, for example – but *The Caucasian Chalk Circle*'s trial importantly foregrounds, in both its pleadings and just judgment, the importance of emotion in jurisprudence. Natella Abashvili's lawyers note her "fear" of losing her child, but the plaintiff herself falls short in describing this claim in emotional terms: "It's not for me to describe to you the tortures of a bereaved mother's soul, the anxiety, the sleepless nights," she testifies (*Caucasian* 89). The banality of her emotional plea – which her lawyer equally tritely recapitulates as the "moving statement" of "the human tragedy of a mother" (89) – contrasts vividly with the palpable rage that Grusha rains down on the judge at the thought of being separated from her adopted charge: "Aren't you ashamed of yourself when you see how afraid I am of you? […] You can take the child away from me, a hundred against one, but I tell you one thing: for a profession like yours, they ought to choose only bloodsuckers and men who rape children" (92). Grusha's screed not only foregrounds her own emotions; it presumes that Azdak is heartless and dares him to feel "ashamed." She is as yet unaware that Azdak's wisdom stems precisely from his emotional sensitivity: his chalk circle test seeks to evaluate the sincerity of Grusha's and Natella's emotional rhetoric by gauging their willingness to do Michael harm. His judgment awards the child to the mother whose emotional claim is most strongly substantiated in context-specific action. (Unlike in Brecht's sources, she is not the child's birth mother.[26]) We might say that Azdak exposes the particular inadequacy of the lawyer's generalizing "human tragedy of a mother."

But the chalk circle test happens late in the play. In contrast to his advice, in *In the Jungle of the Cities*, to focus on the finish, Brecht's proactive defense against directors who would cut scenes from *The Caucasian Chalk Circle*[27] validates the centrality of the emotionally complex journeys that precede the trial. ("Couldn't you make it shorter?" the Expert asks the Singer at the end of the prologue, and the Singer answers "No" [8]. The "moral" – a helpful analogue for the problem of the prologue but not a precept for its resolution – is not as simple as some commentators have suggested: despite stock characters such as the "Girl Tractor Driver," Brecht's project is considerably more complicated than social realist propaganda.) First, the intertwined plots of Grusha and Azdak emphasize the cognitive basis of emotions. William James had proposed a causal relationship – "we feel sorry because we cry" – that helped structure the behaviorist paradigm (1066); Brecht reverses this causality, as the Singer makes clear while presenting Grusha's conflicted state when she temporarily abandons Michael:

THE SINGER Why so gay, you, making for home?

THE MUSICIANS Because with a smile the child
Has won new parents for himself, that's why I'm gay.
Because I am rid of the loved one
That's why I'm happy.

THE SINGER And why are you sad?

THE MUSICIANS I'm sad because I'm single and free
Of the little burden in whom a heart was beating:
Like one robbed, like one impoverished I'm going. (*Caucasian* 35)

The Singer expresses the "aboutness," in Nussbaum's terminology, of the emotions felt by Grusha, who assesses the happiness she feels at being relieved of the burden Michael had represented against the sorrow that she feels in his absence (*Upheavals* 33). Emotions, the later Brecht tells us, are object-directed states motivated by evaluations.

These evaluations are derived from beliefs. Emotions occur within the context of an agent's viewpoint; they are based on his or her "scheme of goals and projects, the things to which [he or she] attach[es] value in a conception of what it is […] to live well," as Nussbaum puts it (*Upheavals* 49). Thus, just as the beliefs that underlie emotional motivations and emotional object-choice can be refined, so too can emotional responses be developed. The initiating event of Grusha's journey (taking Michael) is a choice clearly unwise from the viewpoint of "rational" deduction, as The Stableman correctly recognizes: "I'd rather not think what'd happen to the person seen with that child" (*Caucasian* 23). However, despite its happy ending, the play is equally clear that it does not valorize Grusha's "'abnormal' humanist action," in Darko Suvin's wonderful coinage (165). Rather, it demonstrates that she earns wisdom (or more constructive beliefs) during the journey from her initial mistake. Grusha's emotional response toward the infant at the beginning of the play is predicated on a humanist impulse that is expressed, significantly, alongside some unpragmatic dithering to no one's benefit. As the Singer narrates, Grusha delays her escape from Grusinia for an entire night, watching the infant's "soft breathing" and "little fists" in spite of the dangers of a city "full of flame and grief" (*Caucasian* 25; 25; 24). It is no accident that her action clearly hinges on the one emotion, empathy, for which Brecht never abandoned his contempt.[28] As the Singer relates,

> [S]he heard
> Or thought she heard, a low voice. The child
> Called to her, not whining but calling quite sensibly
> At least so it seemed to her: "Woman," it said, "Help me."
> Went on calling not whining but calling quite sensibly:
> "Don't you know, woman, that she who does not listen to a cry for help
>
> But passes by shutting her ears, will never hear
> The gentle call of a lover
> Nor the blackbird at dawn, nor the happy
> Sigh of the exhausted grape-picker at the sound of the Angelus."
> Hearing this […]
> she went back to the child
> Just for one more look, just to sit with it
> For a moment or two till someone should come […] (*Caucasian* 24)

Moreover, Grusha's empathetic response, which is neatly yoked to her selfdelusion (just "one more look," she promises) and lack of sense, inheres in an impulse to Aristotelian identification that Brecht consistently scorns. She misreads the child's cries as a "sensible" argument not for quick flight (with or without him) but rather about her own relationship with her lover. (Tellingly, the Singer describes Grusha's act of empathy in erotic terms: "*Verführung* [seduction]" [*Der kaukasische* 116].) Grusha has herself just been abandoned by Simon Chachava, and her attraction to the child, the playwright implies, is narcissistic. She thus reads the child's cries in the context of universal "love" instead of within the specific context in which, according to Brecht, ethical choices ought to be made. Her emotion is predicated on inappropriate beliefs. Indeed, the vague humanistic impulse she feels – an apparent "maternal instinct" that is revealed to be a projection of her own unhappiness and that Brecht called a "suicidal weakness" – is no firmer a foundation for an emotional response than Natella's "human tragedy of a mother" ("Short Organon" 203; *Caucasian* 89). Grusha, in her "humane" action, in fact ignores important personal (and class) values and, in so doing, endangers her own life as surely as revolutionary war endangers the aristocratic infant's.

One condition for Azdak's decision to award her custody of Michael, then, is Grusha's admission of error, made possible by her grueling journey out of Grusinia: "I ought to have walked away quickly on that Easter Sunday," she eventually concedes (*Caucasian* 48). While it is still emotional, Grusha's claim to the infant gains validity only after the development of her emotional ethos. During the trial, it stands on objectively better ground: importantly, it resides not in general love but in particular love – the bond of social utility and responsibility – that the two have developed during their journey together. “He’s mine,” Grusha declares, “I’ve brought him up according to my best knowledge and conscience. I always found him something to eat. Most of the time he had a roof over his head. And I went to all sorts of trouble for him. I had expenses, too. I didn’t think of my own comfort. I brought up the child to be friendly with everyone. And from the beginning I taught him to work as well as he could” (88; 88–89). The trial’s assessment is that her feeling of “love” in relation to its object, Michael, has been clarified, a clarification that Azdak’s sound judgment confirms. (If the Cook – who, it is implied, has not left Grusinia during the insurrection – fails to understand Grusha’s decision to fight for Michael, this failure must then reflect her own need for emotional refinement: “What I can’t understand is why you want to hold on to it at any price, if it’s not yours,” she declares [83]). Grusha’s action (mothering the child), then, does not change during the play. However, the emotion that motivates this action changes, as does the foundational belief that grounds the emotion.

The other necessary condition for Azdak’s judgment is, of course, his own emotional development, which is initiated (with dramaturgical neatness) by an abnormal humanist action of his own: harboring the Grand Duke. The Singer ties his action to Grusha’s explicitly: “On the Easter Sunday of the great revolt, when the Grand Duke was overthrown / And his Governor Abashvili, father of our child, lost his head / The village clerk Azdak found a fugitive in the woods and hid him in his hut” (*Caucasian* 61). Azdak must repent his “compassionate” decision, which like Grusha’s is deductively based on a categorical imperative instead of inductively derived from particular circumstances. Significantly, once Azdak realizes the fugitive’s identity, his appropriate emotion – shame, the emotion that Grusha later accuses him of lacking – incites him to surrender. “In the name of Justice, I demand to be judged severely in a public trial!” Azdak declares (64). But a comment that Azdak makes during this scene – “I *don’t* have a good heart! How often am I to tell you I’m a man of intellect?” – hints at the distance that he must still travel in his emotional development (62). A good heart is not the problem; indiscriminate good-heartedness that jeopardizes class interests is.

Azdak’s development into judicious good-heartedness is thematized in the convolutions of his two years as judge during the civil war, during which time he makes problematic rulings (including the acquittal of an alleged rapist – in an overcorrection that misapplies emotional logic – on the grounds that he was aroused by the victim’s beauty [*Der kaukasische* 164–66]). Brecht parallels these convolutions to the geographic distance that Grusha must travel to earn custodial rights to Michael, a distance that literalizes her own emotional development. Brecht sets the many strategic errors each makes in the context of a carnivalesque period of misrule – “*die Zeit der Unordnung*” – that makes possible the sober wisdom into which each is initiated (*Der kaukasische* 169): Azdak after his second appointment as judge (following the civil war), and Grusha after she passes the chalk circle test and is reunited with Simon (*Der kaukasische* 169). This reunion, of course, is facilitated by Azdak’s decision “accidentally” to divorce her from Yussup: “Have I divorced the wrong ones? I’m sorry, but it’ll have to stand. I never retract anything. If I did, there’d be no law and order” (*Caucasian* 96).

Ending the play with Azdak’s divorce of the “wrong” couple, Brecht highlights several of the play’s themes: the significance of Azdak’s errors, which have made possible his evolved *ethos* and also the happy resolution of Grusha’s plot; the importance of emotional concerns in upholding ethical “law and order”; and the difficulty (relative to categorical deduction) of adequately doing justice to those concerns. More generally, by foregrounding the importance of error, Brecht privileges an attitude of provisionality for a society whose concept of law is to be founded on individual and social desires – desires, Brecht stresses, to be continually reassessed. As he writes in the “Short Organum,” “[t]he laws of motion of a society are not to be demonstrated by ‘perfect examples,’ for ‘imperfection’ (inconsistency) is an essential part of motion and of the thing moved” (195). These demonstrated laws of motion, moreover, are to be understood by the spectator in his or her cognizance of the play’s complex analogical relationships.

Importantly, here too Brecht leaves open the space for interpretive error whose importance in emotional and ethical evolution he has repeatedly stressed. In assessing the play’s structure, Suvin himself errs in asserting that Brecht ties an emotional story (Grusha’s) to a political problem (that of the kolkhozes): “their

[Grusha and Azdak's] success can then be transferred *a fortiori* to the more rational kolkhoz situation," he writes (169). Suvin's distinction violates Brecht's careful union of the two. It is more productive to understand both Grusha's relationship to the fruit-growing kolkhoz and her relationship to Azdak as dialectical: negotiating these dialectics, the spectator may derive emotional (i.e., rational) insight. The play's offer of wisdom is thus complex, as Brecht himself had warned,

> *dann ist das Vorspiel als ein Hintergrund erkennbar, der der Praktikabilität dieser Weisheit sowie auch ihrer Entstehung einen historischen Platz anweist. Das Theater darf also nicht die Technik benutzen, die es für die Stücke vom Parabeltypus ausgebildet hat*. ("Zu 'Der kaukasische'" 342)
>
> [the prologue is recognizable as a background, which situates the practicability of this wisdom as well as its evolution in a historical context. The theatre must not use the technique that is developed for parable plays.]

Not a parable, the play presents an "attitude [*eine Haltung*]" toward the disagreement between the kolkhozes and for the spectator's own development. And, significantly, this development requires a *recognition* of the practicability (in our own lives) of the "attitude" that Grusha's story upholds; that is, Brecht relies on an updated notion of anagnorisis, as Walter Benjamin elegantly concedes: "All the recognitions achieved by epic theatre have a directly educative effect; at the same time, the educative effect of epic theatre is immediately translated into recognitions – though the specific recognitions of actors and audience may well be different from one another" (25). The audience's recognitions do not require *identification* with Grusha (a "*tragische Figur*," Brecht called her in his journal [*Journale* 2: 192]) but rather the cognitive negotiation of various dialectics – a negotiation facilitated by means of a refraction, through the onstage audience and the choric Singer, of their impulse to identification.

The Caucasian Chalk Circle is thus paradigmatic of the epic theatrical mode, which is principally concerned with the "attitudes [*Verhalten*] which people adopt towards one another" (Brecht, "On the Use" 86; "Über die Verwendung" 157). As the story of the dueling kolkhozes makes clear, society's "laws of motion" ideally lead to better communal living among individuals. Brecht had written in 1939 that the theatre should provide "models of men's life together such as could help the spectator to understand his social environment and both rationally and emotionally to master it" ("On Experimental Theatre" 133) – but, by the late 1940s, the once-antonymical categories of "reason" and "emotion" would be fully integrated. Indeed, the play's transformation of its spectators' behaviors – a transformation by which the success of the modern theatre must be judged, according to Brecht ("Kleines Privatissimum" 39) – begins by offering them experiential evidence of this integration in the fable of Grusha and Azdak: as Brecht put it in a posthumously published note, "If a feeling [i.e., attitude (*Gesinnung*)] is to be an effective one, it must be acquired not merely impulsively but through the understanding" ("Notes" 247; "*Katzgraben*" 456).[29] That is, this transformation is effected not through emotional coercion but rather through a clarification that helps spectators refine the beliefs that inform their emotions and, in turn, the ethical "attitudes" that Brecht seeks to transform.

Such a clarification of emotional judgment, then, resembles Aristotelian katharsis, if we follow Golden's interpretation, in which spectators derive experiential pleasure and inductive wisdom from their emotional experience. Brecht's surprising fit with an Aristotelian model is only improved by the cognitivist interpretations put forth by Halliwell and Nussbaum, each of whom views emotions as cognitive and each of whom foregrounds the desire for ethical actions engendered by emotional experiences. If we accept these models, *The Caucasian Chalk Circle* comes close to replicating the form that *The Measures Taken* had parodied. But Brecht's greatest value to Aristotelian commentary inheres precisely in his continued rejection – after he had made concessions to emotion and even recognition – of the formal unity that Aristo-tle's prescriptions claim to produce. While *The Measures Taken* had put its juridical mock-catharsis onstage ("Demonstrate how it happened and why, and you will hear our verdict," the Control Chorus declares [*Measures* 77]), *The Caucasian Chalk Circle*'s open analogical structure frustrates the closure that should result from katharsis. The space for error that Brecht leaves open at the ending of the play enables but does not guarantee (let alone provide) an emotionally clarifying catharsis. Just as in *Sophocles' Antigone*, we never return to the setting of the prologue; the structure achieves unity only "by its effect on the spectators' reality," as Suvin notes – not only their interpretive negotiation of the play's complexities but also the ethical decisions they make after their emotional experience of it (Suvin 174). As Althusser astutely remarks in *For Marx*, "[Brecht] wanted to make the spectator into an actor who would complete the unfinished play, but in real life" (146). Therefore, Brecht severs katharsis from mimesis and attaches it to praxis, the realm in which he believes that theatre's emotional effects ought to be registered and felt. He thus rescues the spectator from an emotional passivity before the spectacle, facilitating the "attitude" for ethical action – an attitude that, as he had diagnosed in 1935, is no basis for katharsis as formulated by Aristotle.[30]

In this revision, Brecht exposes, *avant la lettre*, the principal drawback of the model of kathartic clarification. Golden and Nussbaum each declare that their model's principal strength is its explicit location of katharsis within mimesis; indeed, Nussbaum claims that this fact recommends "clarification," prima facie, above other translations of the word "*katharsis*" (*Fragility* 388; italics original). But accounts such as hers necessarily elide the feature of Aristotelian emotion that Brecht most strongly derides: the potential intransitivity or passive function of emotions, whose capacity to incite bodily pleasure is an end in itself, an end guaranteed by the identification that pity facilitates. This capacity is foregrounded in Aristotle's remarks on katharsis in the *Politics*, in which he defines the term in opposition to "mathesis" [instruction or enlightenment], explicitly describing "cathartic" as antithetical to "ethical": the pipes, Aristotle states, "are not an instrument of *ethical* but rather of *orgiastic* effect, so their use should be confined to those occasions on which the effect produced by the show is not so much *instruction* [i.e., *mathesis*] as a way of working off the emotions [i.e., *katharsis*]" (*Politics* 1341a 17; emphasis added).[31] Proponents of "clarification" emphasize the spectator's emotional cognition and, especially in Nussbaum's case, consequent ethical behavior. In so doing, they perform unwittingly the same displacement that Brecht performs intentionally: dramatic closure is made to occur in the spectator's "real life" instead of within the plot, upsetting Aristotle's formalism and ignoring the gap, well theorized by Paul Ricoeur, between Aristotelian poetics and rhetoric.[32] As Martha Husain summarizes, Nussbaum "sees the definitory *telos* of a tragedy as 'the generation of tragic responses' in an audience" that is comprised of agents capable of ethical action (115). However, as Aristotle stresses in *Poetics* 8, the mimetic plot finds its unity within itself. To this plot, characters are subordinated; they are objects and not agents.

Brecht helps us to understand the clarification model's considerable exegetical appeal in spite of its limitations. "Clarification" provides a way of negotiating the *Poetics*' problematic tension between individual and collective spectatorship by highlighting spectacle's capacity for engendering collective harmony among individual agents. Brecht helpfully illuminates the negotiation between the individual and the social in *The Caucasian Chalk Circle* in several ways: by paralleling the claims of individuals (in the fable) to those of collectives (in the prologue) and by demonstrating – in the intersecting emotional and geographical trajectories of Grusha and Azdak – how individual emotional journeys facilitate the harmonious union of individual interests. The cognitivists thus help to defend Aristotle against Platonic charges by describing how emotions can provide illumination and shape the beliefs that ensure better communal living.

Readings such as Nussbaum's also help us to clarify the challenges and concessions that Brecht offers to the *Poetics*. First, they explain Brecht's apparently paradoxical position that theatre should de-emphasize "common humanity" and "divide its audience" in order to facilitate better social living ("Indirect Impact" 60). Thus, their individualist paradigm of spectatorship allows us to reconcile Brecht's anti-Aristotelian desire to refract the audience's identification (by means of *Verfremdung*) with his Aristotelian goal of greater understanding through aesthetic pleasure. Second, they validate Brecht's claim that theatrical experience can transform emotions from "outworn, decrepit, [and] subjective" to "new, manifold, [and] socially productive" ("Little Private" 161) – illuminating his obscure pledge, in a poem from "Der Messingkauf," to transform "*Gerechtigkeit zur Leidenschaft* [justice into passion]" ("Gedichte" 327). Third, and most importantly, their limitations vindicate Brecht's decision to effect this transformation by sustaining his challenge to Aristotelian mimesis. An emotional ethos should be developed, Brecht tells us, from a position of agency – a position of skepticism, even resistance.

At one point in *The Caucasian Chalk Circle*, Michael is permitted by Grusha to play with some other children. The Tallest Boy, whose authority over the others Brecht slyly roots in his physical size, declares: "Today we're going to play Heads-off. *To a fat boy:* You're the Prince and you must laugh. *To Michael:* You're the Governor. *To a girl:* You're the Governor's wife and you cry when his head's chopped off. And I do the chopping.[…] *They form a procession. The fat boy goes ahead, and laughs. Then comes Michael, and the tallest boy, and then the girl, who weeps"* (*Caucasian* 56–57). The Tallest Boy intends that his pageant go unchallenged by the other children; he hopes to direct their emotional responses while preserving the only action for himself. In the children's abnegation of their own agency – an abnegation that passive theatrical experience may incite, Brecht warns – The Tallest Boy's script can recapitulate emotional clichés: the Fat Prince laughs because that is what fat princes do, the Wife cries because that is what wives do, and neither gains knowledge of the evaluative beliefs that ought to inform emotional responses. In this way, they are like the spectators whom Brecht saw in the bourgeois theatre, "somewhat motionless figures in a peculiar condition […] True, their eyes are open, but they stare rather than see, just as they listen rather than hear" ("Short Organum" 187).

In Brecht's theatre, agency was not to be thus inhibited. While the rest of the children play their parts, the young Michael Abashvili rejects his passive role, and this rejection disrupts the Tallest Boy's grim beheading plot, steering the script away from tragedy: Michael demands a sword of his own and then reframes the pageant by comically toppling over (*Caucasian* 57). Brecht too sought to disrupt the old scripts with the unexpected, challenging the doctrine of realism, which he had earlier blamed on Aristotle. Brecht would rewrite Aristotle in the "Short Organum" (its title ironically recalling Aristotle's *Organum*): "And we must always remember that the pleasure given by representations of such different sorts hardly ever depended on the representation's likeness to the thing portrayed" (182). Having thus challenged mimesis, Brecht could end his treatise with a sly wink at – and an important correction to – the theorist he had dialectically opposed with such vigor:

> [O]ur representations must take second place to what is represented, men's life together in society; and the pleasure felt in their perfection must be converted into the higher pleasure felt when the rules emerging from this life in society are treated as imperfect and provisional. In this way the theatre leaves its spectators productively disposed even after the spectacle is over. Let us hope that their theatre may allow them to enjoy as entertainment that terrible and never-ending labour which should ensure their maintenance, together with the terror of their unceasing transformation. Let them here produce their own lives in the simplest way; for the simplest way of living is in art. (205)

In constructing political representations for the stage, Brecht forces the audience into engagement by leaving the dramaturgy open: he resists Aristotle's structural prescriptions in the *Poetics*, which emphasize the plot's completeness. This resistance to closure is meant to be not only aesthetically but also argumentatively productive. While Aristotle had noted in the *Metaphysics* that at the end of an argument "[w]e must […] draw our conclusions from what has been said, and after summing up the result, bring our inquiry to a close," Brecht preferred also to leave his arguments open – to force his auditors to connect the final dots by, and for, themselves (Aristotle, *Metaphysics* 1: 401). As he stresses in both *Sophocles' Antigone* and *The Caucasian Chalk Circle*, such a state of residual agitation in the audience is not only productive but crucial when the question at hand is open and its satisfactory answers necessarily time-bound.

notes

[1] I am grateful to Martin Meisel for his helpful comments on an earlier version of this article.

[2] Throughout this article, I have cited Brecht in English translation for ease of reading; the original German is included where germane or where no published transla

tion exists. Uncredited translations are my own. Citations to *The Measures Taken* refer to Brecht's 1930 version. For variations among Brecht's multiple versions – including variations in this passage specifically – see *Die Maßnahme* (7–209).

3 The reading of Brecht's play as a "tragedy" is common: in addition to Sokel (135– 36), see Orr (53) and Nelson, who explains that "[t]he play's tragic effect is documented by the reaction of audience and critics to the premiere in 1930, by the changes Brecht made in the play, by his later attitude to it, and finally by later scholarly discussion" (570). On the play's 1930 reception, see Steinweg (319–46, 398–99).

4 The comments appeared in *Die literarische Welt*; as Willett notes, the interviewer had paraphrased Brecht (qtd. in Brecht "Conversation" 16). The German text therefore does not appear in Suhrkamp's thirty-volume edition of Brecht's *Werke*.

5 A good consideration of the new view of emotion that has emerged by the "Short Organum" is provided by White's recent *Bertolt Brecht's Dramatic Theory* (231– 37) (reviewed in this volume).

6 That early Soviet theatre theory was strongly marked by the influence of behaviorism and reflexology is widely acknowledged: see, for example, Law and Gordon (36–37, 40–41, 126, 263) and Eaton (40–41, 64). Eisenstein's debt to behaviorism is both more easily discernible and less well documented in English-language scholarship. He explicitly grounded his early theory of montage – which, of course, he formulated in and for the theatre alongside Meyerhold, before he turned to filmmaking – in his understanding of Pavlov and especially Vladimir Bekhterev. See, for example, this assertion from "The Montage of Film Attractions": "[t]he method of agitation through spectacle consists in the creation of a new chain of conditioned reflexes by associating selected phenomena with the unconditioned reflexes they produce" (45). In early writings such as this one, Eisenstein repeatedly cites Bekhterev (e.g., "Montage" 49; "Constantja" 68; "Perspectives" 155), whose works Richard Taylor notes that the director had studied (Eisenstein, Notes, "Constantja" 308 n6). Even in 1936, by which time Eisenstein's views on psychology had become colored by his interests in psychoanalysis and "Oriental" thought, his teaching program for film directors included readings by both Bekhterev and Pavlov ("Teaching Programme" 86).

7 A note about usage: I use "katharsis" in its strictly Aristotelian sense, to denote an apparatus theorized in the *Poetics* as central to the definition of tragedy. I use "catharsis" in its more general senses – that is, as it has been used in post-Aristote-lian dramatic theory and everyday parlance.

8 Willett's technically inaccurate translation of "Reflexologen" as "Pavlovians" conveys Brecht's sense well; reflexology like that of Bekhterev evolves out of Pavlovian behaviorism.

9 This text was published only in English, in a translation prepared by Brecht and Eva Goldbeck; his original German typescript is incomplete (Brecht, "German Drama" 81; *Werke* 22: 939).

10 Eisenstein himself seems to have understood this insight as Aristotelian: in a clear reference to *Poetics*, he noted that his 1925 montage film *Strike* should "stir the spectator to a state of pity and terror" (qtd. in Bordwell 61). And, more generally, his prescriptions for aesthetically successful representations – with aesthetic success measured in terms of the spectacle's effect on the spectator – share key features with Aristotelian dramatic theory.

11 Brecht's connection with, and debt to, Soviet artists such as Sergei Tretjakov and Meyerhold (especially at the time of Brecht's work with Piscator) is well documented: see, for example, Arvon (69–73), Eaton (9–37), Lunn (53–55, 101–02, 123–24), and Willett (*Theatre* 109–10). Brecht himself noted the "tremendous impact [*ungeheuere Wirkung*]" on his work of the films of Eisenstein ("Entwurf" 138).

12 This passage is published exclusively in English; see note 9 above.

13 Eisenstein extended Meyerhold's biomechanical method, calling for mechanical duplication of emotional states rather than the naturalistic emotional representations favored by Stanislavsky and his adherents: Eisenstein's notion that an actor could duplicate an emotion by expertly embodying its physical effects persuasively suggests the extent to which behaviorist ideas had penetrated Soviet cultural discourse of the 1920s and 1930s. As Taylor notes, Eisenstein sought to "subjugate the actor's mind and body to the discipline of gymnastic control and the actor himself more completely to the dictates of the director" (Eisenstein, Notes, "Teaching Programme" 366 n10). Eisenstein had even coined a word for such an actor: "*naturshchik* [mannequin]."

14 This comment from 1936 represents Brecht's evolution from his early faith in behaviorist acting precepts like those of Eisenstein: just six years earlier, Brecht had noted that "[j]ust as moods and thoughts lead to attitudes and gestures, so do attitudes and gestures lead to moods and thoughts" [*So wie Stimmungen und Gedankenreihen zu Haltungen und Gesten führen, führen auch Haltungen und Gesten zu Stimmungen und Gedankreihen*]." ("Zur Theorie" 397).

15 As Golden has pointed out, an earlier interpretation of katharsis as clarification [*Aufklärung*] "had no effect on the mainstream of criticism of the *Poetics*" ("Mimesis and Katharsis" 145). Stephan Odon Haupt had proposed in 1915 that "*katharsis* in Aristotle's sense is neither moral nor 'hedonic' nor therapeutic but rather intellectual [*die Katharsis in Aristoteles' Sinn weder ethisch noch „hedonisch" noch therapeutisch ist, sondern intellektualistich*]" (18); he quotes a letter he received from Otto Immisch in 1907 as the origin of the idea. But the "clarification" theory of katharsis would have to wait until its cultural moment.

16 "If catharsis is understood as 'clarification' in the intellectual sense of the word, then the final clause of the definition of tragedy in chapter 6 may be translated as, 'achieving, through the representation of pitiful and fearful situations, the clarification of such incidents'" (Golden, "Catharsis" 58). Halliwell writes, "I have therefore concluded […] that tragic *katharsis* in some way conduces to an ethical alignment between the emotions and reason: because tragedy arouses pity and fear by appropriate means, it does not, as Plato alleged, 'water' or feed the emotions, but tends to harmonise them with our perceptions and judgements of the world" (200–01). Similarly, see also Nussbaum, *Fragility* (391) and "Tragedy" (282–83).

17 The goal of tragedy, these accounts remind us, is the attainment of pleasure-giving knowledge. Golden writes, "Since tragedy as a species of poetry must involve learning and since, according to Aristotle, it is specifically concerned with pitiful and fearful situations, we must assume that tragedy in some way involves learning about pity and fear" ("Catharsis" 55). Compare Nussbaum and Halliwell: For Aristotle, pity and fear will be sources of illumination or clarification, as the agent, responding and attending to his or her responses, develops a richer self-understanding concerning the attachments and values that support the responses. (Nussbaum, *Fragility* 388) And because of this integration [of emotion] into the total experience of tragedy, *katharsis* must also be intimately associated with the pleasure derivable from the genre, for this pleasure […] arises from the comprehension of the same action which is the focus of the emotions. (Halliwell 201) Nussbaum and Halliwell's shared avoidance of the term "learning" – she opts for "understanding"; he, for "comprehension" – relates to their more fully articulated view of emotions as cognitive. Because of behaviorism, "learning" can still carry the connotation of a nonintellectual process.

18 "Since learning for Aristotle means proceeding from the particular to the universal, we must also assume that tragedy consists of the artistic representation of particular pitiful and fearful events in such a way that we are led to see the universal laws that make these particular events meaningful" (Golden, "Catharsis" 55). Nussbaum gives an example: "The sight of Philoctetes' pain [in Sophocles' *Philoctetes*] removes an impediment (ignorance in this case, rather than forgetfulness or denial), making him [i.e., Neoptolemus] clearer about what another's suffering means, about what his good character requires in this situation, about his own possibilities as a human being. The audience, in the midst of wartime, is recalled to awareness of the meaning of bodily pain for another, for themselves" ("Tragedy" 282). Similarly, see also Halliwell (77–80).

19 Nussbaum's book offers a cogent summary and distillation of several decades of philosophical and psychological writing about the emotions; as she acknowledges, she relies on (among others) William Lyons' 1980 *Emotion*, Ronald de Sousa's 1987 *The Rationality of Emotion*, and Robert Gordon's 1990 *The Structure of Emotions: Investigations in Cognitive Philosophy* (see *Upheavals* 22). For good, if incomplete, surveys of cognitivist emotion theory see Deigh (focusing on the discourse of philosophy) and chapter six of Strongman (focusing on the discourse of psychology).

20 Most post-Cartesian views of emotion presuppose that physiological change in the emotional subject precedes his or her awareness of that physiological change. The reversal of cause and effect (a judgment, then a physiological change) was initiated by Maranon's adrenaline studies in the 1920s (see Strongman 62) but was principally associated with Schachter and Singer, who established that subjects injected with adrenaline did not consider themselves to be in an "emotional state" until they were put in an emotion-appropriate context. Thus, they proposed that "cognitive factors are potent determiners of emotional states" (Schachter and Singer 398).

21 Throughout the 1940s and 1950s, behaviorist psychologists complicated their models to fit the complexities of human behavior successfully enough that, as late as 1968, Fodor could write, "surely […] one or another form of behaviorism is true" (49). Its dominance would soon slip: see, for example, Gardner (109–11) or Lazarus (8–15).

22 Brecht had expressed the same point succinctly in an untranslated essay from 1935: "[i]nsofar as Aristotle (in the fourth book of the *Poetics*) speaks generally about the pleasure of imitative representation and calls it the basis of

learning, we go along with him [*Solange der Aristoteles (im vierten Kapitel der „Poetik") ganz allgemein über die Freude an der nachahmenden Darstellung spricht und als Grund dafür das Lernen nennt, gehen wir mit ihm*]" ("Kritik" 171).

23 The poem is not included in the play in the Suhrkamp *Werke* (see instead, Brecht, *Brechts Antigone* 167). Antigone's words in the original are particularly pointed: "*Halt für ein Beispeil*."

24 "It also follows from what has been said that it is not the poet's business to relate actual events, but such things as might or could happen in accordance with probability or necessity" (Aristotle, *Poetics* 1451a).

25 Citations are to Brecht's 1954 version of the play; variant scenes are gathered in Hecht (36–54).

26 The story of Solomon is structurally parallel (and its verdict identical) to that told in a thirteenth-century play by Li Hsing Dao. Brecht probably did not use the Chinese source directly; rather, he cribbed from the popular 1924 adaptation of Klabund (Alfred Henschke), itself only one of several Western adaptations (Ritchie 7– 11).

27 Brecht had addressed the issue in his untranslated 1955 dialogue "Ein Umweg":

> P *Man hat in X vor, den „Weg in die nördlichen Gebirge" zu streichen. Das Stück ist lang, und der ganze Akt, macht man geltend, ist schließlich nur ein Umweg.[…]* B *Die Umwege in den neuen Stücken sollte man genau studieren, bevor man einen abgekürzten Weg geht. Er mag länger wirken.[…] Erstens kommt es im Prozeß nicht auf den Anspruch der Magd auf das Kind, sondern auf den Anspruch des Kindes auf die bessere Mutter an, und die Eignung der Magd zur Mutter. Ihre Zuverlässigkeit und Brauchbarkeit werden gerade durch ihr vernünftiges Zögern beim Übernehmen des Kindes erwiesen.[…] In der Magd Grusche gibt es das Interesse für das Kind und ihr eigenes Interesse im Widerstreit miteinander. Sie muß beide Interessen erkennen und beiden zu folgen versuchen.* (403–04)
>
> [P The people at X want to cut "In the Northern Mountains." The play is long, and they assert that the whole act is really no more than a detour.[…]
>
> B Detours in modern plays ought to be studied meticulously before one takes a short cut. It might seem longer.[…] To start with, the trial isn't about the maid's claim to the child but rather about the child's claim to the better mother and the maid's suitability as a mother. Her reliability and usefulness are proven by her reasonable hesitations about taking on the child.[…] Within the maid Grusha, the child's interests and her own are in opposition. She must recognize and try to follow both interests.]

28 In 1926, Brecht was said to comment that characters "are not matter for empathy; they are there to be understood" ("Conversation" 15). Brecht did not greatly attenuate this early conviction as he began to rethink the role of emotion in the "non-Aristotelian" theatre. In 1944, for example, Brecht maintained that "[i]t is only opponents of the new drama, the champions of the 'eternal laws of the theatre,' who suppose that in renouncing the empathy process the modern theatre is renouncing the emotions" ("Little Private" 161). Or, as Brecht put it in his unfinished "Der Messingkauf": "Only one out of many possible sources of emotion needs to be left unused, or at least treated as a subsidiary source – empathy" (173).

29 "*Damit Verlaß ist auf die Gesinnung, muß sie nicht nur impulsiv, sondern auch verstandesmäßig übernommen werden*" (Brecht, "*Katzgraben*" 456). Willett's translation of this passage – "If a feeling is to be an effective one, it must be acquired not merely impulsively but through the understanding" (Brecht, "Notes" 247) – is uncharacteristically unsatisfactory. Brecht stresses the reliability of a spectator's attitude (*Gesinnung*) that is to be engendered through emotion – that is, through impulses but also understanding.

30 Brecht had written in his "Kritik der 'Poetik' des Aristoteles" that "*[e]ine völlig freie, kritische, auf rein irdische Lösungen von Schwierigkeiten bedachte Haltung des Zuschauers ist keine Basis für eine Katharsis*" (172).

31 The haste with which Nussbaum dismisses (in a footnote!) these remarks in the *Politics* may betray their problematizing impact on her argument: "The brief remarks are indeed unclear. *Katharsis* is linked in some way with medical treatment; but it is also linked to education.[…] There is no obstacle to the translation 'clarification,' and no reason to suppose that at this time Aristotle had any very precise view of what clarification, in this case, was" (*Fragility* 503 n18). Golden has also dismissed the *Politics* passage ("Purgation Theory" 474–77), as Halliwell himself has pointed out (355).

32 Ricoeur writes, Aristotle defines it [rhetoric] as the art of inventing or finding proofs. Now poetry does not seek to

> prove anything at all: its project is mimetic; its aim […] is to compose an essential representation of human actions; its appropriate method is to speak the truth by means of fiction, fable, and tragic *muthos*. The triad of *poiesis–mimesis–catharsis*, which cannot possibly be confused with the triad *rhetoric–proof–persuasion*, characterizes the world of poetry in an exclusive manner. (Ricoeur 13) Belfiore makes a similar point, contrasting the emotions that are elicited by a rhetorician (as prescribed, for example, in the *Rhetoric*) with those elicited by the tragic poet (as prescribed in the *Poetics*). Belfiore acknowledges the cognitive aspect of the tragic emotions, but she is careful to note that "tragedy, unlike rhetoric, does not have an immediate, practical

goal, but leads us to contemplate imitations for their own sake" (253).

works cited

Althusser, Louis. *For Marx*. Trans. Ben Brewster. London: Allen Lane, 1969. Aristotle. *Metaphysics*. Trans. Hugh Tredennick. Loeb Classical Library. Vols. 17–18. Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1953. ———. *Poetics*. *On Poetry and Style*. Trans. G.M.A. Grube. Indianapolis: Hackett, 1989. ———. *Politics*. Trans. T.A. Sinclair. Rev. ed. New York: Penguin, 1981. Arvon, Henri. *L'esthétique marxiste*. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1970. Belfiore, Elizabeth S. *Tragic Pleasures: Aristotle on Plot and Emotion*. Princeton: Princeton UP, 1992. Benjamin, Walter. *Understanding Brecht*. Trans. Anna Bostock. London: NLB, 1973. Bordwell, David. *The Cinema of Eisenstein*. Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1993. Brecht, Bertolt. "Alienation Effects in Chinese Acting." *Brecht on Theatre* 91–99. ———. "Anmerkungen zur Oper 'Aufstieg und Fall der Stadt Mahagonny.'" Brecht, *Werke* 24: 74–84. ———. "Amerkungen zur ‚Mutter'." Brecht, *Werke* 24: 150–90. ———. *Antigonemodell*. Brecht, *Werke* 25: 73–168. ———. "Appendices to the Short Organum." Brecht, *Brecht on Theatre* 276–81. ———. *Brecht on Theatre: The Development of an Aesthetic*. Ed., trans., intro., and notes John Willett. London: Methuen, 1990. ———. *Brechts Antigone des Sophokles*. Ed. Werner Hecht. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1988. ———. *Briefe*. 3 vols. Brecht, *Werke*. Vols. 28–30. ———. *The Caucasian Chalk Circle*. Trans. James and Tania Stern, with W.H. Auden. London: Methuen, 1996. ———. "Conversation with Bert Brecht." Brecht, *Brecht on Theatre* 14–17. ———. *Der Dreigroschenprozeß: Ein soziologisches Experiment.* Brecht, *Werke* 21: 448–514. ———. *Der kaukasische Kreidekreis.* Brecht, *Werke* 8: 93–191. ———. "'Der Messingkauf': An Editorial Note." Brecht, *Brecht on Theatre* 169–75. ———. *Die Maßnahme: Kritische Ausgabe mit einer Spielanleitung von Reiner Steinweg*. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1972. ———. "Ein Umweg." Brecht, *Werke* 23: 403–04. ———. "Entwurf einer Vorrede für eine Lesung." Brecht, *Werke* 22: 138–40. ———. "The Film, the Novel, and Epic Theatre." Brecht, *Brecht on Theatre* 47–51.

———. "Formal Problems Arising from the Theatre's New Content." Brecht, *Brecht on Theatre* 226–30. ———. "Formprobleme des Theaters aus neuem Inhalt." Brecht, *Werke* 23: 109–13. ———. "Gedichte aus dem Messingkauf." Brecht, *Werke* 12: 319–31. ———. "The German Drama: Pre-Hitler." Brecht, *Brecht on Theatre* 77–81. ———. *In the Jungle of the Cities*. Trans. Gerhard Nellhaus. *Collected Plays*. Vol. 1. Ed. John Willett and Ralph Manheim. London: Methuen, 1970. 117–78. ———. "Indirect Impact of the Epic Theatre." Brecht, *Brecht on Theatre* 57–62. ———. *Journale*. 2 vols. *Werke*. Vols. 26–27. ———. "*Katzgraben*-Notate." *Werke* 25: 401–90. ———. "Kleine Liste der beliebtesten, landläufigsten und banalsten Irrtümer über das epische Theater." Brecht, *Werke* 22: 315–16. ———. "Kleines Organon für das Theater." Brecht, *Werke* 23: 65–97. ———. "Kleines Privatissimum für meinen Freund Max Gorelik." Brecht, *Werke* 23: 37–39. ———. "Kritik der ‚Poetik' des Aristoteles." Brecht, *Werke* 22: 171–72. ———. "A Little Private Tuition for my Friend Max Gorelik." Brecht, *Brecht on Theatre* 159–63. ———. "Masterful Treatment of a Model." Brecht, *Brecht on Theatre* 209–15. ———. *The Measures Taken*. *The Jewish Wife and Other Short Plays*. Trans. Eric Bentley. New York: Grove, 1965. 75–108. ———. "The Modern Theatre is the Epic Theatre." Brecht, *Brecht on Theatre* 33–42. ———. "Notes on Erwin Strittmatter's Play '*Katzgraben.*'" Brecht, *Brecht on Theatre* 247–51. ———. "On Experimental Theatre." Brecht, *Brecht on Theatre* 130–35. ———. "On the Use of Music in an Epic Theatre." Brecht, *Brecht on Theatre* 84–90. ———. "Short Description of a New Technique of Acting which Produces an Alienation Effect." Brecht, *Brecht on Theatre* 136–47. ———. "A Short Organum for the Theatre." Brecht, *Brecht on Theatre* 179–205. ———. *Sophocles' Antigone*. Trans. Judith Malina. New York: Applause, 1990. ———. "Theatre for Pleasure or Theatre for Instruction." Brecht, *Brecht on Theatre* 69–77. ———. "Über die Verwendung von Musik für ein episches Theater." Brecht, *Werke*

22: 155–64. ———. “Über rationellen und emotionellen Standpunkt.” Brecht, *Werke* 22: 500–02. ———. *Werke: Große kommentierte Berliner und Frankfurter Ausgabe*. Ed. Werner Hecht et al. 30 vols. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1988–2000. ———. “Zu ‚Der kaukasische Kreidekreis.’” Brecht, *Werke* 24: 341–48. ———. “Zur Theorie des Lehrstücks.” Brecht, *Werke* 21: 397. Deigh, John. “Cognitivism in the Theory of Emotions.” *Ethics* 104.4 (1994): 824–54. Dickson, Keith A. *Towards Utopia: A Study of Brecht*. Oxford: Clarendon, 1978. Eaton, Katherine Bliss. *The Theater of Meyerhold and Brecht*. Westport, CT: Greenwood, 1985.

Eisenstein, Sergei. “Constanta (Whither ‘The Battleship Potemkin’).” *Selected Works 1*: 67–70. ———. “The Montage of Film Attractions.” Eisenstein, *Selected Works 1* 39–58. ———.Notes. Eisenstein, “Teaching Programme” 366–69. ———. Notes. Eisenstein, “Constanta” 308. ———. “Perspectives.” Eisenstein, *Selected Works 1* 151–60. ———. *Selected Works 1: Writings, 1922–34*. Ed. and trans. Richard Taylor. Bloomington: Indiana UP, 1988.

———. *Selected Works 3: Writings, 1934–47*. Ed. Richard Taylor. Trans. William Powell. London: BFI, 1996.

———. “Teaching Programme for the Theory and Practice of Direction: How to Teach Direction.” Eisenstein, *Selected Works 3.* 74–97.

Fodor, Jerry A. *Psychological Explanation: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Psychology*. New York: Random House, 1968.

Gardner, Howard. *The Mind’s New Science: A History of the Cognitive Revolution*. New York: Basic, 1985.

Golden, Leon. “Catharsis.” *Transactions and Proceedings of the American Philological Association (TAPA)* 93 (1962): 51–60. ———. “The Clarification Theory of Catharsis.” *Hermes* 104 (1976): 437–50. ———. “Mimesis and *Katharsis*.” *Classical Philology* 64.3 (1969): 145–53. ———. “The Purgation Theory of Catharsis*.” Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism* 31.4 (1973): 473–79. Halliwell, Stephen. *Aristotle’s Poetics*. Chapel Hill: U of North Carolina P, 1986. Haupt, Stephan Odon. *Wirkt die Tragödie auf das Gemüt oder den Verstand oder die Moralität der Zuschauer? [Does Tragedy Affect the Mind, the Understanding, or the Morality of the Spectators?]*. Berlin: Leonard Simion, 1915.

Hecht, Werner, ed*. Materielen zu Brechts “Der kaukasische Kreidekreis.”* Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1966.

Husain, Martha. *Ontology and the Art of Tragedy*. Albany: SUNY P, 2002.

“Katharsis [καθαð̌ρσιος].” *Greek–English Lexicon*. 9th ed. 1940.

James, William. *The Principles of Psychology*. Vol. 2. Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1981.

Law, Alma, and Mel Gordon. *Meyerhold, Eisenstein and Biomechanics: Actor Training in Revolutionary Russia*. London: McFarland, 1996.

Lazarus, Richard S. *Emotion and Adaptation*. New York: Oxford UP, 1991.

Lunn, Eugene. *Marxism and Modernism: An Historical Study of Lukács, Brecht, Benjamin, and Adorno*. Berkeley: U of California P, 1982.

Nelson, G.E. “The Birth of Tragedy Out of Pedagogy: Brecht’s ‘Learning Play’ *Die Massnahme*.” *German Quarterly* 46.4 (1973): 566–80.

Nussbaum, Martha C. *The Fragility of Goodness: Luck and Ethics in Greek Tragedy and Philosophy*. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1986.

———. “Tragedy and Self-sufficiency: Plato and Aristotle on Fear and Pity.” *Essays on Aristotle’s Poetics*. Ed. Amélie Oksenberg Rorty. Princeton: Princeton UP, 1992. 261–90.

———. *Upheavals of Thought: The Intelligence of Emotions*. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2001.

Orr, John. “Terrorism as Social Drama and Dramatic Form.” *Terrorism and Modern Drama*. Ed. John Orr and Dragan Klaicð̌. Edinburgh: Edinburgh UP, 1980. 48–63.

Ricoeur, Paul. *The Rule of Metaphor: Multi-disciplinary Studies of the Creation of Meaning in Language*. Trans. Robert Czerny, with Kathleen McLaughlin and John Costello. Toronto: U of Toronto P, 1977.

Ritchie, James MacPherson. *Brecht: Der Kaukasische Kreidekreis*. London: Edward Arnold, 1976. Schachter, Stanley, and Jerome E. Singer. “Cognitive, Social, and Physiological Determinants of Emotional State.” *Psychological Review* 69.5 (1962): 379–99. Silk, M.S. “Aristotle, Rapin, Brecht.” *Making Sense of Aristotle: Essays in Poetics*. Ed. Øivind Andersen and Jon Haarberg. London:

Duckworth, 2001. 173–95. Sokel, Walter. “Brecht’s Split Characters and His Sense of the Tragic.” *Brecht: Critical Essays*. Ed. Peter Demetz. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1962. 127–39.

Steinweg, Reiner. “Zeugnisse der Rezeption.” Brecht, *Die Maßnahme* 319–469.

Strongman, K.T. *The Psychology of Emotion: Theories of Emotion in Perspective*. New York: John Wiley, 1996.

Suvin, Darko. “Brecht’s *Caucasian Chalk Circle* and Marxist Figuralism: Open Dramaturgy as Open History.” *Critical Essays on Bertolt Brecht*. Ed. Siegfried Mews. Boston: G.K. Hall, 1989. 162–75.

White, John J. *Bertolt Brecht’s Dramatic Theory*. Rochester, NY: Camden House, 2004.

Willett, John. *The Theatre of Bertolt Brecht: A Study from Eight Aspects*. London: Methuen, 1959.